You are here

Rational Choice Politics

Rational Choice Politics

Four Volume Set
Edited by:

February 2009 | 1 688 pages | SAGE Publications Ltd
The formal modeling techniques of rational choice theory have become central to the discipline of political science, for example with regard to the understanding of the working of legislatures, coalition governments, executive-bureaucracy relations or electoral systems. The collection includes the very best work in this field, as well as an editors' introduction to each volume that describes the importance of the articles and their place in political science.

Volume I: Social Choice and Equilibrium

Volume II: Voting, Elections and Electoral Systems

Volume III: Legislatures and Pressure Politics

Volume IV: Bureaucracy, Constitutional Arrangements and the State

Part 1: Social Choice
On the Rationale of Group Decision-making Duncan Black
A Direct Proof of Arrow' s Theorem Julian H. Blau
A Possibility Theorem on Majority Decisions Amaryta Sen
Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result Allan Gibbard
Part 2: Equilibrium
A Notion of Equilibrium and its Possibility under Majority Rule Charles R. Plott
Intransitivities in Multidimensional Voting Models and Some Implications for Agenda Control Richard D. McKelvey
Generic Instability of Majority Rule Norman Schofield
Implications from the Disequilibrium of Majority Rule for the Study of Institutions William H. Riker
On 64%-Majority Rule Andrew Caplin and Barry Nalebuff
Covering, Dominance, and Institution Free Properties of Social Choice Richard D McKelvey
The Uncovered Set and the Core Gary C. Cox
Bargaining in Legislatures David P. Baron and John Ferejohn
A Bargaining Model of Collective Choice Jeffrey S. Banks and John Duggan
Part 3: Electoral Systems
Electoral Equilibrium under Alternative Voting Institutions Gary Cox
A Voting Model Implying Duverger's Law and Positive Turnout Timothy J. Fedderson
Party Formation and Policy Outcomes under Different Electoral Systems Massimo Morelli
Part 4: Voting and Elections
A Theory of the Calculus of Voting William H. Riker and Peter C. Ordeshook
Voter Participation and Strategic Uncertainty Thomas R. Palfrey and Howard Rosenthal
The Swing Voter's Curse Timothy J. Fedderson and Wolfgang Pesendorfer
Voting as Communicating Thomas Pickety
The Control of Politicians: An Economic Model Robert J. Barro
Incumbent Performance and Electoral Control John Ferejohn
Robustness of the Multidimensional Voting Model: Candidate motivations, uncertainty and convergence Randall L. Calvert
Credibility and Policy Convergence in a Two Party System with Rational Voters Alberto Alesina
An Economic Model of Representative Democracy Timothy Besley and Stephen Coate
A Dynamical Model of Political Equilibrium Gerald H. Kramer
Elections, Coalitions, and Outcomes David Austin-Smith and Jeffrey S. Banks
Elections, Governments and Parliaments in Proportional Representation Systems Pressure Politics David P. Baron and Daniel Diermeier
Part 5: Pressure Politics
The Welfare Costs of Tariffs, Monopolies and Theft Gordon Tullock
The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society Anne O. Krueger
A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence Gary Becker
On the Form of Transfers to Special Interests Stephen Coates and Stephen Morris
Legislators and Interest Groups: How unorganized interests get represented Arthur T. Denzau and Michael C. Munger
Protection for Sale Gene Grossman and Elhanen Helpman
The Independent Judiciary in an Interest Group Perspective William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner
Part 6: Bureaucracy
Sophisticated Sincerity: Voting over endogenous agendas David Austen-Smith
Gatekeeping and Monopoly Power of Committees: An analysis of sincere and sophisticated behavior Arthur T. Denzau and Robert J. Mackay
Cohesion in Legislatures and the Vote of Confidence Procedure Daniel Diermeier and Timothy J. Fedderson
Bicameralism and Its Consequences for the Internal Organization of Legislatures Daniel Diermeier and Roger B. Myerson
Sophisticated Voting and Agenda Independence in the Distributive Politics Setting John Ferejohn, Fiorina P. Morris and Richard D. McKelvey
Collective Decision Making and Standing Committee: An informational rationale for restrictive amendment procedures Thomas W. Gilligan and Keith Krehbiel
Buying Supermajorities Timothy Groseclose and James Snyder
Where's the Party? Keith Krehbiel
On Division of the Question John B. Kadane
Coalitions and Cabinet Government Michael Laver and Kenneth A. Shepsle
Committee Design with Endogenous Information Nicola Persico
Political Resource Allocation, Controlled Agendas, and the Status Quo Thomas Romer and Howard Rosenthal
Modelling the Interaction of Parties, Activists and Voters: Why is the political center empty? Norman Schofield and Itai Sened
Institutional Arrangements and Equilibrium in Multi-dimensional Voting Models Kenneth A. Shepsle
The Industrial Organization of Congress Barry R. Weingast and William J. Marshall
Part 7: Bureaucracy
Agency Budgets, Cost Information, and Auditing Jeffrey S. Banks
Bureaucratic Expertise versus Legislative Authority: A model of deception and monitoring in budgeting Jonathan Bendor, Serge Taylor and Roland Van Gaalen
Delegation and the Structure of Policy-Making: A transactions cost politics approach David Epstein and Sharyn O'Halloren
Congressional Influence on Bureaucracy John Ferejohn and Charles Shipan
Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Political Control Mathew D. McCubbins, Roger G. Noll and Barry R. Weingast
Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police patrols versus fire alarms Mathew D. McCubbins and Thomas Schwartz
Part 8: Constitutional Arrangements
The Economic Role of Political Institutions: Market-preserving federalism and economic development Barry R. Weingast
A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures Charles M. Tiebout
An Economic Theory of Clubs James M. Buchanan
The Politician and the Judge: Accountability in government Eric Maskin and Jean Tirole
Decision Making in Political Systems: Veto players and presidentialism, parliamentarism, multi-cameralism, and multipartism George Tsebelis
Part 9: The State
Dictatorship, Democracy and Development Mancur Olson
Constitutions and Commitment: The evolution of institutions governing public choice in seventeenth century england Douglas C. North and Barry R. Weingast
Coordination, Commitment and Enforcement: The case of the merchant guild Anver Greif, Paul Milgrom and Barry R. Weingast
A Rational Theory of the Size of Government Allan H. Meltzer and Scott F. Richard
Comparative Politics and Public Finance Torsten Persson, Gérard Roland and Guido Tabellini
A Theory of Political Transitions Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson

Preview this book

Keith Dowding

Torun Dewan

Kenneth A Shepsle

Purchasing options

Please select a format:

ISBN: 9781412945028