Rational Choice Politics
Four Volume Set
Edited by:
- Keith Dowding - Australian National University, Australia
- Torun Dewan - London School of Economics, UK
- Kenneth A Shepsle - Harvard University, USA
February 2009 | 1 688 pages | SAGE Publications Ltd
The formal modeling techniques of rational choice theory have become central to the discipline of political science, for example with regard to the understanding of the working of legislatures, coalition governments, executive-bureaucracy relations, or electoral systems. The collection includes the very best work in this field, as well as an editors' introduction to each volume that describes the importance of the articles and their place in political science.
- Volume I: Social Choice and Equilibrium
- Volume II: Voting, Elections and Electoral Systems
- Volume III: Legislatures and Pressure Politics
- Volume IV: Bureaucracy, Constitutional Arrangements and the State
VOLUME 1: SOCIAL CHOICE AND EQUILIBRIUM
Part 1: Social Choice
Duncan Black
Julian H. Blau
Amaryta Sen
Allan Gibbard
Part 2: Equilibrium
Charles R. Plott
Richard D. McKelvey
Norman Schofield
William H. Riker
Andrew Caplin and Barry Nalebuff
Richard D McKelvey
Gary C. Cox
David P. Baron and John Ferejohn
Jeffrey S. Banks and John Duggan
Part 3: Electoral Systems
Gary Cox
Timothy J. Fedderson
Massimo Morelli
VOLUME 2: VOTING, ELECTIONS AND PRESSURE POLITICS
Part 4: Voting and Elections
William H. Riker and Peter C. Ordeshook
Thomas R. Palfrey and Howard Rosenthal
Timothy J. Fedderson and Wolfgang Pesendorfer
Thomas Pickety
Robert J. Barro
John Ferejohn
Randall L. Calvert
Alberto Alesina
Timothy Besley and Stephen Coate
Gerald H. Kramer
David Austin-Smith and Jeffrey S. Banks
David P. Baron and Daniel Diermeier
Part 5: Pressure Politics
Gordon Tullock
Anne O. Krueger
Gary Becker
Stephen Coates and Stephen Morris
Arthur T. Denzau and Michael C. Munger
Gene Grossman and Elhanen Helpman
William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner
VOLUME 3: LEGISLATURES
Part 6: Bureaucracy
David Austen-Smith
Arthur T. Denzau and Robert J. Mackay
Daniel Diermeier and Timothy J. Fedderson
Daniel Diermeier and Roger B. Myerson
John Ferejohn, Fiorina P. Morris and Richard D. McKelvey
Thomas W. Gilligan and Keith Krehbiel
Timothy Groseclose and James Snyder
Keith Krehbiel
John B. Kadane
Michael Laver and Kenneth A. Shepsle
Nicola Persico
Thomas Romer and Howard Rosenthal
Norman Schofield and Itai Sened
Kenneth A. Shepsle
Barry R. Weingast and William J. Marshall
VOLUME 4: BUREAUCRACY, CONSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS AND THE STATE
Part 7: Bureaucracy
Jeffrey S. Banks
Jonathan Bendor, Serge Taylor and Roland Van Gaalen
David Epstein and Sharyn O'Halloren
John Ferejohn and Charles Shipan
Mathew D. McCubbins, Roger G. Noll and Barry R. Weingast
Mathew D. McCubbins and Thomas Schwartz
Part 8: Constitutional Arrangements
Barry R. Weingast
Charles M. Tiebout
James M. Buchanan
Eric Maskin and Jean Tirole
George Tsebelis
Part 9: The State
Mancur Olson
Douglas C. North and Barry R. Weingast
Anver Greif, Paul Milgrom and Barry R. Weingast
Allan H. Meltzer and Scott F. Richard
Torsten Persson, Gérard Roland and Guido Tabellini
Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson